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ORIENTAL NOTHINGNESS 
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ln this short paper， 1 would like to explain briefty about th巴philosophyof Nishida， Tanabe， 
Nishitani and Hisamatsu. 
1. NISHIDA'S PHILOSOPHY OF ABSOLUTE 
NOTHINGNESS 
Although Kitaro Nishida (1870時 1945)is one of 
]apan's greatest Zen Buddhist philosophers， his idiom 
and style of thought-organization are difficult for 
West巴rnreaders to follow. 
Typical of Mahayana Buddhism is his empha-
sis on the contradictory aspect of phenomeno 
logical reality， which is finally "nothingness" or 
"voidness. "ー.Everyone who is familiar with 
lndian and Buddhist philosophy knows the 
difficulty of rendering into Western terms and 
concepts those Oriental views which are ascetical 
ways of approaching salvation rather than 
philosophical concepts and therefor巴 d巴fyana-
lytical examination. Nishida， though， tried with 
the help of Western philosophy to find a new logic 
which would also incorporate such views. N 0 
wonder， then， the difficulty in understanding him， 
and his constant complaint that he was never 
understood even by his best pupils， Orinetals 
though they were， familiar with his cultural 
background. ーー.the fact remains that Nishida is 
the most demanding thinker ]apan ever produce田
d. To understand him the reader must bring， in 
addition to a competent knowledge of Western 
and Eastern philosophy， a willingness to try to 
see "the beyond" which is Nishida himself. The 
crux of the matter is， 1 think， that Nishida wants 
to be a universal thinker. To put it better， though 
Nishida wants indeed to give his logic to Oriental 
culture， his aim is also to place it in a world 
culture， to make it universal. It is this bold 
attempt much more than his poetical style or his 
overly-repetitious accumulation of dialectical 
negations， which gives rise to the complexity of 
Nishida's thought and the reader's difficulties.1 
ln his book， lntelligibility and the Philosophy 01 
Nothingness. there are three essays: "The lntelligible 
World，" "Goethe's Metaphysical Background" and 
"The Unity of Opposites." The first of these analyzes 
the Mind which contains al reality according to 
Mahayana thought. The title， "The lntelligible 
World，'" refers to the images and concepts present 
within the Mind. According to Nishida， the Mind is 
composed of four separate levels， each supported by 
the next， inthe same way， to use his words， as a fine 
kimono is lined with silk. From the outermost level to 
the innermost， we have: the Universal of ]udgment， 
th巴Universalof Self-consciousness， the Universal of 
the lntelligible W orld， and then a level called 
Nothingn巴s.One fundamental aspect of Nishida's 
philosophy is that being supported by or having a 
"place" in the Universal of the mind is a necessary 
prerequisite for the state of "being.川
The innermost level of Nothingness， although it 
supports al the others， does not itself rest on 
anything， so N othingness cannot be said to hav巴any
"being" and ther巴foremust be "nonbeing" or N 0-
thingness. As such， N othingness is the undistorted 
mirror of the Mind， reftecting al finite objects.' The 
"external world" of personality and individuality are 
included in the Universal of ]udgment. All d巴finable
phenomena are "predicates" of the Universal， and 
among these is that of self conceived of as an 
individual thinker. What is the subject (thinker) of 
these predicates， and how does the concept of an 
individual self come forth? we can answer these 
questions by proceeding to the second level of the 
Mind， the Universal of Self-consciousness 
On the second level， consciousness of the self as 
"something thinking" rather than "something thought 
" occurs.' If these first two levels of the Mind were al 
that existed， we might think there was a definite and 
inherent di任erencebetween thinker and thoughts， or 
between subject and object， but exploring further， we 
discover the Universal of the lnt巴lligibleW orld， 
where these divisions ar巴 erased.6 At this level， 
subject and object are combined and indistinguishable 
from each other. However， there is an apparent 
contradiction in this Universal， because， like Plato's 
world of ideas， there is some incongruity between 
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what is and what ought to be. At this level， "in the 
degree in which the conscience sharpens， one feels 
more guilty."7 Arriviing at the innermost level of the 
Mind， N othingness， even moral contradictions cease 
to exist. At this level， any distinction between values， 
like good and evil are understood as meaningless 
Existence of the moral Self means conscious-
ness of one's own imperfection， and an infinite 
striving towards the ideal. In the degree in which 
the conscience sharpens， one feels more guilty. 
To solve this contradiction， and to see the true 
depth of the Self， means to reach religious 
salvation. Man comes to know the real bottom of 
the Self， only by denying himself completely. In 
this state of mind， there is neither good nor evil 
By transcending even the intelligible Self in the 
direction of noesis. one frees oneself even of the 
free will. There is no more Self which could sin. 
Even the idea of the good is the shadow of 
something that is without form8 
In the end， reality is this formless N othingness， in 
which there is no di仔erencebetween good and evil， no 
conception of the self as an individual， no distinction 
between subject and object， nor among al the 
particular predicates of th巴Universalof Judgment. 
The essay， "Goethe's Meta，戸hysicalBackground，" 
was written to show that Goethe had an intuitive 
understanding of N othingness. 
To depict eternity， Greek artists used perfection of 
form， but Oriental art is "formless吋 witheternity a 
part of the background， which "embraces al things 
from behind."10 It has also been said that Goethe's 
poetry is formless， communicating a feeling of 
individuality against a background of N othingness 
Nishida says: 
. . Goethe's pantheism encloses individuality 
everywhere. Nature， in Goethe's sense， does not 
deny individuality ， but produces som巴thing
individual everywhere. This nature is like an 
infinite space which， itself formless， produces 
form everywhere. Like the moonlight in "An den 
Mond"， like the sea in "Der Fischer"， and like the 
mist in "Erlkonig"， Goethe's "nature" is essential-
ly something that harmonizes with our heart.ll 
Goethe's Nature both produces and encloses indivi-
dual forms at the same time in the pantheistic sense， 
and as such cannot be distinguished from Buddhist 
N othingness 
Goethe's universalism does not， like Spinoza's ， 
reduce everything to the one substance， denying 
man; he sees al things in man. '.. For Goethe， 
there is no inward and no outward ; everything is 
as it is; it comes from where ther巴isnothing， and 
goes where there is nothing 
And just in this coming from nothingness and 
going into nothingness ther巴 isthe gentle sound 
of humanity. 
Yes， Goethe's universalism is just the opposite 
of that of Spinoza. His philosophy of life， based 
on this kind of universalism， does not remind us 
of the intellectual love of the Stoic sage， but of 
the love of Maria， the Eternal-Womanly.12 
In the following lines from Faust， Nishida自nds
indications of the N othingness constituting Goethe's 
metaphysical background : 
"All earth comprises 
1s symbol alone ; 
What there ne'er su伍ces
As fact here is known : 
All past the humanly 
Wrought here in love; 
The Eternal-Womanly 
Draws us above".13 
In his essay， "The Unity 01 Ottosites"， Nishida 
discusses the philosophy of N othingness as it applies 
to problems such as the apparent di妊erencebetween 
past and future， and between one and many. These 
seemingly antithetical concepts are formed in the 
unity of real experience. The past consists of events 
already fixed and unchangeable， while in the future， 
an infinite number of potential new forms can be 
conceived to exist. In an abstract sense， history 
progresses from past to future， but in actual reality， 
there is only the present. One can exist neither in the 
past nor in the future， yet information on the 
concretely determined past and expectations of the 
nebulous future are opposites which are conjoin巴d
only in the unity of the moment of experience. 
This present is a point without duration. Even an 
infinitely short movement in any direction will take 
us into the past of future， both of which are beyond 
the realm of actual experience: we dwell only in the 
duratioriless present. The "World" proceeds from 
present to present. The point where the indefinite 
future turns into unchangeable past is the moment of 
"forming" and is called the present. Thus， history is 
the movement from "formed" to "forming" experienc-
ed in the timeless present. The forming (present) 
includes both the fo口ned(past) and the unformed 
(future) and is therefore a unity of these opposites. 
Nishida says: 
In the world as unity of opposites， moving from 
the formed towards the forming， past and future， 
negating each other， join in the present; the 
present， as unity of opposites， has form， and 
moves， forming itself， from present to present 
The world moves， as one single present， from the 
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formed to the forming. The form of the present， 
as unity of opposites， isa style of the productivity 
of the world. This world is a world of poiesis. 
In such a world， seeing and acting are a unity 
of opposites. Forming is seeing， and from seeing 
comes acting. We see things， acting-reflecting， 
and we form because we see. When we speak of 
acting， we begin with the individual subject. But 
when acting， we are not outside the world， but in 
the world. Acting is essentially "being acted". If 
our acting is not merely mechanical or tele-
ological， but truly forming， then the forming 
must be， at the same time， a "being formed". We 
are essentailly forming， as individuals of a world 
which forms itself.14 
The unity of opposit巴spresent another aspect in the 
seeming antithesis between one and many. Zen 
scholars affirm the reality of a world of plurality and 
individuality while acknowledging the identity of al 
things. This would appear to be an unresolvable 
paradox but the Zen scholars view it as a mere 
abstraction. In the durationless present， the whole 
(one) con tains the parts， (many) and the parts make 
up the whole. "The world where innumerable indi-
viduals， negating each other， are united， isone single 
world which， negating itself， expresses itself in 
innumerable ways."15 
To express it di任erently，the Buddha Mind pro 
duces a multiplicity of images and realizes itself in al 
of them， but knowing its ultimate unity， recognizes 
that even the r巴自ectionof itself as a separate， 
individual entity destroys its all-inclusive oneness. 
Calling the one "God" and the many "men，" Nishida 
depicts the paradox which the supposedly individual 
human being senses when confronted with the reality 
of an indivisible God of which he is an expression or 
manifestation.16 The crisis of "conversion: occurs 
when the ego which had conceived of itself as an 
individual faces this "God" which melts al indi-
viduality into oneness， and su汀 endersits individuali-
ty. The Buddha Mind， or N othingness， isrealized 
when this abandonment of empirical self occurs and 
the identity of the tru巴selfwith God is acknowledged 
Nishida says 
The world of unity of opposites has its unity 
and self-identity， but not in itself. Identity， as 
unity of opposites， isalways transcendent for this 
world. That is why self-formation of the world， 
as determination without a determining one， is
spiritual. The fact that the world has unity and 
identity in absolute transcendence， means that 
the individual many are confronted with the 
transcendent one. and that the individual is 
individual because it confronts transcendence. By 
confronting God， we have and are personality. 
The fact that we， as personal Self， are confront-
ing and opposing God， means on the other hand， 
at the same time， that we ar巴joinedwith God 
God and we are in the relationship of absolute 
unity of the opposites of the one and the many 
As individuals of the world of unity of oppo-
sites， we are in the depth of our origin in 
contradiction with ourselves. This contradiction 
does not diminish with the evolution of culture; 
on the contrary， there it becomes more and more 
obvious. In the world of unity of opposites which 
has its unity in the transcendent， the process of 
action-intuition and poiesis from the formed 
towards the forming， is essentially a human 
progress. In this direction， too， we do not join the 
absolute， God.17 
The past and the future are united in the instant of 
present experience， and in the same way， the one and 
the many are conjoined within the unity of that 
moment. The one recognizes itself in the many who 
are identical to it in the durationless present of 
expen巴nce.
In spite of certain obscurities and seeming vagaries， 
Nishida's thought has much merit for the student of 
Buddhist philosophy. First of al， there is the interac 
tion between a mind committed to Zen Ideas and the 
terminology of Western philosophical thought. The 
most important aspect of Nishida's philosophy is that 
he has framed al his ideas usiing the Western way of 
thinking and manupulating concepts， expanding them 
to their furthest extension and breaking through their 
limitations. No Eastern thinking or specifically 
Eastern ideas hav巴beenallowed， and Western logic is 
always adhered to， but Nishida's philosophy can be 
said to be basically Eastern. Nishida does not attept 
to criticize or interpret Western philosophy through 
pre-existing Eastern concepts， nor does he seek to 
combine or synthesize Eastern and Western schools of 
thought 
The significance of Nishida's philosophy 
consists in the fact that he was the first Japanese 
who discarded the work of being only a populari-
zer of West巴rnphilosophy and tried to build up a 
system of his own. This ystem， though including 
the method of Western philosophy， is stil 
thoroughly Oriental in its theme and fundamental 
approach.ー ...Naturally，Nishida is not the only 
one who aspired to be more than a purveyor of 
Western philosophy， nor is he unique in his 
Oriental approach. N evertheless， he must be 
singled out for his perseverance in the task and 
his positive accomplishment.18 
We can say that he has surrendered himself to a 
characteristically Western way of thinking， and thus 
placing himeself in the nonexistent， so that he is able 
to transcend Western philosophy， making it the 
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object of his embracing acceptance. This can be done 
only when the fundamental guiding principle is 
Absolute N othingness， and it is only in this way that 
a true synthesis of Eastern and Western philosophical 
thought， as opposed to superficial eclecticism can be 
achieved， fundamentally at least. G. K. Piovesana 
says: 
No doubt， Nishida， the "absolute nothingness" 
is a much more profound expression of religious 
experience than Western formulations， because 
there the universe is swallowed up and the ego 
too has disappeared， only however， to emerge 
again in another instant of this dazzling obscuri-
ty， in a kind of Zen Buddhistic enlightenment. 
Mahayana Buddhism too says that "the concrete 
reality is the void， and the void concrete 
reality". ... For Nishida two ways of knowing-
things are possible: one being the direct apper-
ception of the object， the other the knowledge 
which we can have through self-conscious 
ness. ... In order to avoid any kind of judgment 
which could leave opposition between subject and 
object， or too much "being" in the judgment， 
Nishida thinks of the predicate， as having 
nothing of the entitative nature of the subject 
Therefore， itis a transcendental predicate which 
precisely as applicable to subjects without dis-
tinction can be called nothingness 
This type of dialectic， then， equips Nishida 
with a logic able to express the meaning of 
Oriental culture， based as it is upon the voidness 
of reality. This voidness， itmust be insit巴dupon， 
is not the ontological nothingness of Western 
philosophy， which is usually rendered in Japanese 
by kyomu. It is， rather， what is called mu in 
Japanese， the absolute present with al its inclu-
sive processes and contradictions， which even in 
its most religious nuances has nothing to do with 
a Christion concoption of God as a transcendent 
and personal being.19 
Second， there is a clear indication of the basic 
compatibility of Nishida's and Hegel's philosophies. 
The essence of Mahayana Buddhism is non-rationali-
ty， and Zen is particularly so; in this respect it 
resembles mysticism : sinc巴theessence of Mahayana 
Buddhism transcends language， itis an immediate ?' 
God 
Christianity 
For the Christian， God is Being. (Tillich's 
God is Being itself.) 
The Christian's God represents eternal 
life 
For the Christian， God is absolutely other 
and inexpressible experience. The goal of this 
experience is enlightenment， and its fulfillment is 
Nirvana. Zen Buddhist statements are primarily 
indirect and paradoxical， a method equally important 
in German mysticism. This leads us to the idea that 
Hegel reveals a great mystical heritag巴 inhis 
dialectical method. J apanese philosophy， and specifi 
cally Nishida's philosophy employ paradoxiccal and 
dialectical logics， but Nishida does not particularly 
use the process of thesis， antithesis and synthesis. 
Nishida views judgment as being formed by 
analysis of the intuitive whole. For example， the 
judgment that horses run is formed by having 
actually seen a horse run. The truth of a judgment 
depends on the truth of the cource from which it was 
drawn through th巴 dichotomyof subject and predi-
cate or subject and object. To establish the truth of a 
judgment through its dichotomy， we must refer back 
to intuition， which is considered a self-developing 
whole， similar to Hegel's Notion (Begri任).Nishida 
says "All reality is intuition，" or "All reality is 
immeidate consciousn巴S8"in出esame way as Hegel 
says， "All is Notion，" or "All is Judgment，" and this is 
the pretty much the meaning of Nishida's dictum 
"Consciousness is the Unique Reality."Professor 
Matao N oda says 
Thus， pur巴experiencecomes to cover actually 
the whole range of knowledge， physical， mathe-
matical， and metaphysical. The "pureness" of it， 
in part， means ultimately to be free from 
egocentricity. 
Here Nishida's thought is akin to the dialectic 
of Hegel. Nishida's pure experience proves to be 
a spontaneously dev巴lopingtotality which includ-
es even reflective thinking as its negative phase， 
and in the end pure experience is identified with 
ultimate reality. The title of one of the chapters 
in his "Study of the Good" characterizes Nishida' 
s position somewhat crudely as "Consciousness is 
the Unique Reality円。
Third， Nishida's writing show how Christian terms， 
like God， creation， conversion， agape， etc. can be used 
by Buddhists to communicate ideas totally opposite 
to those of orthodox Christianity. We can compare 
the above te口nsin both religion as follows : 
Buddhism 
The Buddha awakened to the Suchness 
which is beyond Being and non-Being. 
The Buddhist accepts the life-death cycl巴.
For the Buddhist the true self is the 
Absolute Self 
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Creatio河 The creation of the world is not a 
movement of God in Himself， but a free 
0)りusad extra， finding its necessity only in 
His love， but again not casting any doubt 
on His selfsu伍ciency:the world cannot 
exist without God， but if God were not love 
(as such inconceivable!)噂 Hecould exist 
very well without the world 
From Karl Barth， Credo.21 
Conversion Act of total or global faith by which man 
recognizes Christ as the Lord of his life， 
and， in answer to the Gospel， accepts the 
Kingdom which is the Church. Conversion 
to Christ coincides with justification 
Agape God's love for man ; divine love 
The world is・
neither generative nor extinctive， 
neither continuous nor discontinuous， 
neither one nor many， 
neither coming nor going 
From Buddhism Sutra， "Nagarjuna"22 
Kie is a very old word. It is related to the 
sanskrit)りaravritti，defined as "the twining 
about or sudden revulsion at the deepest 
seat of consciousness which is the Buddhist 
moment of conversion" (Christmas Hum-
phreys， A Popular Dictionary of Buddhism， 
N. Y.， 1963， p.146) 
Jihi， compassion， isemphatically a Buddh 
ist concept. Ji means "to bring joy to 
other; " hi means "to take other's suffering 
away." 
In fact， Jihi and agape are similar in that they are both a perfect victory over the ego. 
Buddhist tradition has understood that compassion is the criterion of wisdom， much as 
Christian gnosis tells us that wisdom without love is but like "blaring brass or crashing 
cymbal." (1 Cor. 13・1)
Grace 
Religion is that which inspires man. It is an inspiration and a self-awareness which comes 
to man from an absolute being. It is the spirit of God， the love of God， the mercy of 
Buddha. In what way can man approach the Absolute ? He can rely on the guidance which 
comes to him from absolute spiritual beings in several ways such as grace， th巴gospel，
revelation or Buddha's mercy， his merit and his Vow. Man， however， cannot find this 
religious truth in himself， itmust be communicated to him by the Absolute. Hence our 
meeting which this Absolute calls for a selftess heart and a humble attitude willing to 
inquire after the truth. 
The Nembutsu (the invocation of the name of Amida Buddha) is the central practice of the 
tariki (Other Power)-way. However， itis not the Nembutnu practice but faith that ftows 
from Amida's name which assur巴ssalvation. Salvation by "Other Power" (tariki) is that 
the Original Vow is the only cause of faith which is a altogether the gift of Amida. On the 
tariki-line man seeks oneness through the extinction of the Ego before the overwhelming 
superior Other Power， whereas in the self power (Jiriki)-way he tries to break. through 
the Ego into the Absolute. In both cases the transition into the Absolute signifies oneness， 
which comprises self-exertion and grace. 
In Christian theology， needless to say， this unity is guaranteed by the fact that ultimat巴ly
grace as well as freedom are founded in God， and that thus， in the words of Saint Paul， 
"God is al in al." In Buddhist understanding too， deliverance or salvation leads into the 
sphere of absolute Oneness.23 
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Throughout Nishida's works is the basic assumption 
that the "Oriental religion of Nothingness" teaches 
that the soul is Buddha.24However， he reminds us that 
" 'All is one' does not mean that al are one without 
differe白tiation"25Nishida writes about the outside 
world， nature， biological and social evolution， the 
physical sciences， individual human beings， etc. as if 
they were objectively r巴al，but this seeming di任巴renti-
ation is merely the separation of individual thoughts 
within a single mind. Just as he insists on individuali 
ty， he emphatically denies any real distinction 
between subject and object， and asserts that al things 
are identical in the Buddha Mind. He says : 
The oriental religion of N othingness teaches 
that it is the soul which is Buddha. This is 
neither spiritualism nor mysticism. Logically it is 
the unity of the opposites of the many and one 
"All is one" does not mean that al are one 
without di妊erentiation.It is， as unity of opposit-
es，巴ssentiallythat One by which al that is， is 
Here is the principle of the origin of the historical 
world as the absolute present. We， as individuals 
of the world of unity of opposites， are always in 
touch with the absolute， although we may not 
even say that w巴arein touch with it. It is aid : 
"He who sees and hears in the present instance 
only what is to him clear and distinct， does not 
cling to a certain place， but moves freely in al 
ten directions"ーInthe depth of selfcontradiction 
absolutely to die and to enter the principle "all is 
one"，一一this，and nothing else， isthe religion of 
"it is the soul which is Buddha". It is also said 
"Y ou who are listening to my preaching， you are 
not the four elements， by you can use your four 
elements. When you are able to understand this， 
you will be free to go or to stay". This does not 
mean the conscious Self， which is merely an 
illusionary accompanying one; there must be an 
absolutely denying conversion. Therefore， this is 
an absolute objectivism， in contrast to spiritual 
ism or mysticism. This absolute objectivism is 
the basis for true scienc巴 aswell as for true 
morality. "Soul" does not mean subjective 
consciousness. "The inward， too， cannot be 
grasped". And "nothing" is stil a r巴lative"non-
being" which opposes "being".26 
The soul or self is the Buddha Mind : al di任erentita-
tion occurs inside it. Even though the Zen philosopher 
may discourse learnedly on the reality of a concretely 
differentiated world， itis ultimately nothing more 
than a world of di妊erentiatedideas in the one al-
inclusive Buddha mind， which is after al only the 
ess巴ntialself of th巴 thinkerof ideas. "All objective 
being has its foundation in the S巴lf."27
It is appropriate to close this section with G. K 
Piov巴sana:
If we take Nishida as an example and consider 
his evolving philosophical thought， we can 
determine that his general inspiration stems from 
the background of Mahayana Buddhism and Zen 
N onetheless， this background does not give even 
a hint why Nishida in his study of Western 
thinkers started from J ames and Bergson， went 
through Fichte and Hegel， and produced in the 
end a "logic of nothingness" which， though 
inspired by many other ideas， isfinally Nishida's 
own formulation. In other words， we cannot 
explain the flowering of a great philosopher by 
pointing to the cultural soil in which he is rooted 
We must go much further and consider who tilled 
that soil， what rains fel upon it，and一一 most
important of all--what was the inner quality of 
the seed， namely the creativity and novel ap-
proach of the gr巴atthinker. 28 
2. PHILOSOPHY OF HAJIME TANABE 
Born in Tokyo， Hajime Tanabe (1885-1962) was 
invited to Kyoto University in 1919， and there became 
Nishida's mostr illustrious disciple. Eventually， he 
established the so-called Kyoto School of Philosophy 
1 would like to discuss how Nishida and Tanabe 
dif巴ras follows : 
A) Nishida emphasizes action-intuition， while 
Tanabe stresses the significance of action-faith in 
religious existence 
B) Action-intuition assumes that we exist as an 
element in the creative world. In addition， Tanabe 
also considers the problem of dialectic only in 
relation to the historical world噂 Butfor Nishida. the 
idea of a creative element in a creative world leads to 
a historical viewpoint， where the perspective of the 
whole changes at every moment and can be seen anew 
from a di任erentangle. For Tanabe， on the other hand， 
the pathway through the historical world is like a 
blind alley at every point， and it is with decision and 
courage that one must proceed in order to find his 
way out. To put it another way， Tanabe stresses the 
infinitesimal in contrast to Nishida's integral 
C) For Tanabe， the ethical viewpoint is predomi 
nant， and even in his later years he devoted himslef to 
the study of many religions from an ethico-social 
viewpoint， seeking to reconcile the truth of the Pure 
Land Sect with the Zen Sect in Buddhism as well as 
with the truth of Christianity. However， the immedia 
te realization of Absolute N othingness， taken from 
Zen Buddhism， isthe basic influence in al Nishida's 
thought from beginning to end， so the question for us 
would be : What is faith according to Tanabe? 
If faith is taken in terms of Christian understand 
ing， then the question of Tanabe and Nishida could be 
refined to the objection that is Nishida's system， since 
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he ignore the most basic fact in Christain belief， there 
is no room for faith in the ful Christian sense. 1n 
other words， itcould be said that the same question 
arises between Tanabe and Nishida as between 
Buddhism and Christianity， which do belong to two 
different religious structures， and which cannot be 
reconciled with each other unless one side renounces 
its claim to absolute truth 
Tanabe did not become a Christian. He mentions 
that since he was infiuenced by Nishida， he leaned 
toward Zen intuition， and therefore his particular 
interest in Christianity naturally remained superficial 
He studies the conversions of Pascal， Newman， 
Augustine and Luther， and read Barth's Credo as well. 
He also studied Kierkegaard， but even then he was 
forced to confess that he felt it was one of his weakest 
points that， as a teacher of philosophy， he was unable 
to gain a true understanding of Christian thought. 
He also mentions that he realized that Catholicism 
deserves special attention. He explains by nothing 
that Protestantism has a tendency to turn away from 
objective reality， stressing the interior world and 
subjective faith alone， while Catholicism unites the 
supernatural world of the spirit with the natural 
world， and thus faces history through this unity and 
interpenetration. He obviously had difficulty grasping 
Protestant discussion， especially that of Wrede， 
Barth， and particularly the discussion of the relation 
ship of Paul's image of Christ and the historical ]esus. 
Therefore， inth巴巴nd，he says "1 don't b巴lieve; please 
help my unbelief."29 
3. PHILOSOPHY OF SHIN'ICHI HISAMATSU 
AND KEIJI NISHITANI 
Before studying under Nishida， Nishitani (1900 
) was already attract巴d by Nietzsche and 
Dostoevski， the Holy Scriptures and St. Francis of 
Assisi as well as the two famous Zen masters Hakuin 
(1685-1768) and Takuan (1573-1645). The fact that he 
studied under Heidegger in Freiburg im Br. before 
W orld War I can be deduced from his publications， 
the most important of which is What is Religion? 
(1961). This is one of the most brilliant philosophical 
works to come out of ]apan in years 
1 would like to consider his comprehensive articles : 
1) Nishitani" calls the final reality "emptiness" and 
not "absolute nothingess，" thus it is understood that 
he considers it di任erentfrom (a) any form of nihilism， 
(b) Tanabe's concept of absolute nothingness， and (c) 
that which he purposely associates with the sunyata 
(emptiness) idea of Nagarjuna; in other words the 
traditional Zen interpretation of nothingness 
2) Nishitani abmits that certain trends in Christianト
ty， particularly German mysticism， lean toward the 
true absolute nothingness. However， his intuitions of 
the doctrine of creation， inaddition to his feeling that 
from an orthodox viewpoint， Eckhart must be 
considered a heretic， prevent him from dealing 
effectively with ordinary main-stream theology， 
which， throughout the centuries， showed a deep 
concern for negative theology through its best 
representative 
To discuss the relationship between God and 
absolute nothingness， the following argument is 
basic: If something is possible which is not God， or 
which includes God， then that which was called "God" 
before is not God at al， since no matter what detailed 
explanations we might attempt， ex defi削 tioneit is 
impossible for anything to exist which is either 
further beyond or closer within， either further away 
or nearer， and at the same time is not God 
3) Nishitani's philosophy has another strong point 
his atrraction to religious practice. Nishitani is linked 
with several groups of scholars who make an effort to 
include religions， particularly Zen practice. In this 
connection， the name of Shin'ichi Hisamatsu (1889時
1980) must be mentioned. Graduating from Kyoto 
University， he too became a disciple of Nishida 
However， on Nishida's advice， Hisamatsu practiced 
Zen in addition to studying philosophy. He taught 
Buddhism at the University during the same period of 
time as N ishitani. Hisamatsu wrote on Oriental 
nothingness， and an English translation of his article 
called The Characteristic 01 Oriental Nothingness is 
useful in understanding both Nishitani and Hisa-
matus 
The characteristics of Oriental nothingness， accord-
ing to Hisamatus， are six.31 
1) "The 'not a single thing' nature of Oriental 
N othingness means that as regards that which is 
generally said 'to be' there is in and for Oriental 
N othingness not one single such thing" (I， 76)32 
"Nothing whatever wherever being Myself and 
Myself being nothing whatever wherever is 
Oriental N othing" (ibid.). 
2) It is "like empty.space" (I， 80)， but "it is 
not the same as empty-space， which has neither 
awareness nor life. Oriental N othingness is the 
One who is 'always clearly aware.' Therefore it is 
called (Mind，' 'Self，' or the 'True Man' (I， 82)." It 
is without obstruction， omnipresent， impartial， 
broad and great， formless， pure， without beginn-
ing and without end， the voiding of being and the 
voiding of void 
3) It is Mind-in-Itself: 1t is "in no sense 
inanimate like empty-space. N ot only it is living， 
it also possesses mind. Nor does it merely possess 
mind; it possess self司consciousness."(I， 86).34 
"The tru巴 Buddhais not without mind， but 
possesses mind which is 'without mind and 
without thought，' is not without self-awareness， 
but possesses an awareness which is 'without 
awareness'-an egoless ego， isnot without life， 
but possesses life which is ungenerated and 
unperishing." (I， 87).35 
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4) It is Self: "Speaking in terms of 'seeing，' 
this Mind is the 'active se巴ing'and not the passive 
'being seen'...... But when 1 say here that this 
Mind is句active，'1 mean that this Mind does not 
obtain as 01コject，but obtain as subject 
It does not mean that such a Mind is simply the 
aspεct of 'the active' in separation from 'the 
passive.' In this Mind there is no duality of呂ctive
and passiv巴"(I， 8).36 
5) It is the completely free subject. (I， 
91)37 True liferation in Buddhism is to be 
thoroughly-Oneself-this freedom. In this， true 
liferation in Buddhism differs from state of 
salvation of religions like Christi旦nity.Even such 
a Buddhist sect as th巴JodoShin Sect which， in 
the extemal aspect of it state of salvation， 
resembles Christianity， isdi丘erentfrom Christia 
nity to the extent that as a Buddhist sect it， too， 
must hav巴itultimate base in the freedom nature 
of Oriental N othingness. 1 should like to call this 
freedom nature of Oriental N othingness sub-
jectively-subjective freedom， that is， absolutely 
subjective freedom. (I， 93)38 
6) It is "creative" (I， 94)39 Oriental 
N othingness is this Mind which is to be likened to 
the water as subject. The creative nature of 
Oriental N othingness is to be illustrated by the 
relation between the water and the wave， in 
which the water is forever and in every way th巴
subject. If one were to make a subject of the 
wave which is produced and disappears， this 
would be the ordinary self of man. It is in such an 
ordinary sunject's reverting back from wave to 
water-that is， returning to its source and re 
emerging as the True-Subject of True-Self that 
the characteristics of Oriental N othingness must 
b巴 soughtand are to be found. (I， 97)40 
4. SUMMARY 
Many Japanese philosophers did much more than 
simply spread Westem ideas. The most creative 
thinkers among them determined to supply what they 
f巴ltwas the biggest lack in the Ori巴ntalphilosophical 
tradition: a new logic which would allow them to 
compete with Western philosophers on their own 
ground. Toward this goal， the best minds， like 
Nishida， Suzuki， Tanabe， Hisamatsu and Nishitani 
have spent and are spending a great deal of time and 
energy 
To emphasize the quest for a new logic as a 
characteristic feature of contemporary Japanes巴
philosophy is to invite the obj巴cttionthat this is in 
direct conf!ict with the often-repeated idea that the 
Japanes巴 arealmost congenitally averse to logical 
thinking. Hajime Nakamura has included a long 
chapter in his The W;α~ys 0/ Thinkiηg 01 Eastern 
PeoPle on the "Non-Rationalistic Tendencies" of the 
Japanese people. These tend巴nciescan be summariz 
ed as follows 
In short， the J apanese language has had， at 
least in the past， a structure unfit for expτesslng 
logical conceptions. Consequently， when the 
J apanese adopted the already highly advanced 
conceptual knowl巴dgeof Buddhism 旦ndCon 
fucianism. they made no attempt to express it in 
the original J apanese language. but us巴dChinese 
technical tern1S without modification. Again， in 
translating the concepts of Western learning， the 
]apanese used Chinese characters and did not 
render these concepts into J apanese directly 
Consequently， even today， any marked tendency 
to logical expr巴ssionis hardly apparent in the 
J旦paneselanguage41 
Th巴Japanesepeople. however， in their charac← 
t巴risticway of thinking，呂町 inclinedto grasp this 
order or law in relation to human r巴lationsrather 
than as a law of objective things. This tendency 
has be巴nstrenghtenεd especi呂lythrough the non-
logical character of the ]apanese language 
Consequently， the thinking of the J apanese 
people has not been developed in an objective and 
logical direction42 
As far as his religious views呂re仁oncerned，i t is
clear that Nishida preferred panentheism to 
pantheism and to thεChristian understanding of 
God as transcendent." 
Religious philosophers， rather than specialists 
in philosophy of religion， like Nishida， Tanabe， 
although undeniably inf!uenced by Christian 
existentialism. are more inclined to a type of 
Buddhist nothingness as presented in the cultural 
]apanese heritage. Nishitani Keiji， too， isdefinite 
ly a purveyor of an Oriental type of philosophy of 
r巴ligion. . ]¥jishida， for instance， qualifies his 
position as "panentheismus" and thereby does 
disassociate hifirself from any traditional typ巴of
pantheism守 Itmust be confessed， however， that 
the more one probes Nishida's mind the more one 
would like further clarification on this key 
concept. But ]apanes巴 thinkerslike Nishida 
refuse to enter into these ultimate problems and 
transmit them to religion. And here we enter into 
a field which is not easily dealt with in Western 
philosophical categories， which， itmust be said in 
passing， cannot easily cope巴venwith Western 
religion.44 
Thus， itis easy to ascribe to an Oriental mood any 
thought which has greatly inf!uenced their philosophy 
of religion. It must呂lsobe admitted that a Western 
reader will notice many nonlogical asp巴ctsin their 
way of thinking 
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